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In ing State 
by continuing to count the tail as a leg. The State's reading of the burglary statute 1s 
erroneous as it encourages this Court to construe the statute in a way which corrupts 
the statutory language and intent behind the statute to transmutate a petit theft of a 
$185 item from a home into a felony for "burglarizing" a pawn shop. When Idaho's 
burglary statute is properly understood, it incorporates a requirement that the defendant 
actually invade the owner's possessory interest in the space entered. Since the State 
presented no evidence at the preliminary hearing or at the trial to show Mr. Weeks 
invaded the possessory interest of the pawn shop, this Court should reverse the district 
court's order denying Mr. Weeks' motion to dismiss the information, or alternatively, 
vacate the conviction based on insufficient evidence. 
The State's response in regard to the particular provision of the theft statute 
invoked as the offense underlying the alleged burglary is similarly flawed. Either by its 
plain language or by understanding the legislative intent behind it, that provision of the 
theft statute is designed to apply to people other than the original thief. The State's 
reading to the contrary fails to give meaning to every word in the statute and would 
impermissibly allow pyramiding of charges and sentences. Therefore that reading, like 
the State's improper reading of the burglary statute, should be rejected. 
For any and all of these reasons, this Court should vacate Mr. Weeks' conviction 
for burglarizing the pawn shop. 
1 
were 
be rnn,,c,r,rc,.r, in are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
2 
on, so a 
Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr. Weeks' motion to dismiss the 
information. 




The State acknowledges that the pattern jury instruction for theft pursuant to 
LC. § 18-2403(4) (theft by receiving, possessing, disposing of, etc., stolen property still 
includes the language "by another" as an element of that offense. (Resp. Br., pp.6-7.) 
And yet, it maintains that the district court properly refused to instruct the jury per that 
pattern instruction. (Resp. Br., pp.7-10.) That pattern instruction gives voice to the 
proper understanding of the relevant section of the theft statute, an understanding which 
is evident from either the plain language or the legislative intent of the statute. Reading 
it as the State does fails to give effect to all the language in the statute and would allow 
unconstitutional pyramiding of charges and sentences. Therefore, State's reading 
of that provision is erroneous and should rejected. 
The Plain Language Of The Theft Statute Reveals The Pattern Instruction 
Correctly Includes The "By Another" Language As An Element Of That Offense 
The most notable flaw in the State's attempt to disregard the pattern instruction in 
this case is that it fails to appreciate the fact that the pattern instructions were revised in 
2010, nine years after the Legislature removed the "by another" language from the 
statute itself. (See R., pp.83-85 (copy of the Idaho Session Laws in 2001 ); R., p.86 
(copy of the order revising the pattern instructions in 2010).) And yet, despite the 
statutory amendment, the Supreme Court retained the "by another" element as required 
by the statute. See l.C.J.I. 547. The Supreme Court is presumed to be aware of all 
other statutes and legal precedence when it reviews its rules. See Obendotf v. Terra 
4 
Spray , 145 Idaho 892, 900 (2008); Druffe/1 v. State Dept. of Transp., 136 Ida 
was presumably aware the 
L §18-2403(4) it revised the pattern jury instructions, and yet, it 
determined it was proper to keep the "by another" element in the pattern instructions. 
Thus, the pattern jury instruction recognizes and reflects a fundamental 
understanding of the language in LC. § 18-2403(4): it does not apply to the original 
thief. See LC.J.L 547. This understanding of the statute is evident from the language of 
the statute itself. For example, the statute deals with receiving, obtaining control over, 
and possessing stolen property, as well as disposing of it LC. § 18-2403(4). 'The 
interpretation of a statute 'must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words 
must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be 
construed as a whole."' Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr, 151 Idaho 889, 893 
(2011) (quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362 (2003)) (emphasis added). The 
surrounding text is critical in that endeavor. See State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 867 
(2011) ("the surrounding text of the definition only supports this interpretation," based on 
the unambiguous language of the statute at issue there). 
This means that the statute must be read to give effect to all the items in that list. 
By keeping the "by another" language, the pattern instruction acknowledges what the 
United States Supreme Court has already articulated: many of those listed actions 
cannot be properly applied to the original thief. See Mi!anovich v. United States, 365 
U.S. 551, 558 (1961 ). Therefore, to give effect to the plain language of the statute as a 
whole, there needs to be a "by another" element. 
5 
State to distinguish on 
in a 
la in 
applies to the original thief. (Resp. Br., p.10.) However, that argument only 
serves to disregard the language of the statute as a whole, which is improper. Verska, 
151 Idaho at 893, Schulz, 151 Idaho at 867. 
Thus, the State's argument, which fails to recognize that half the listed actions in 
I . § 18-2403(4) cannot properly be applied to the original thief, as it would 
impermissibly allow pyramiding of charges and penalties for a single criminal act, should 
rejected even at a plain-language leveL By its plain language, construed as a whole, 
and as indicated by the Idaho Supreme Court's continuing recommendation that trial 
courts instruct juries on the element of "by another," I . § 18-2403(4) is not properly 
applied to the original thief. 
The State's final point in this contends that the district court properly 
departed from the pattern instruction in an effort to give a more clear statement of the 
law. (Resp. Br., p.7) However, the Idaho Supreme Court has warned that ''any court 
which varies from jury instructions previously approved by this Court does so at 
considerable risk that the verdict rendered will be overturned on appeal." 
State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 647 (1998). As such, when the trial court departs from 
the pattern instruction, it should only do so in a way that actually clarifies, instead of 
adding to, the confusion in the statute. See State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 275 
(2003). "Trial courts are encouraged to avoid unnecessary appeals and controversy by 
utilizing the instruction that has an accepted history defining the burden the State 
6 
this the district court departed from such an instruction without 
n by not articulating another" element § 18-2403(4 ), 
district court added to the confusion on that point. As noted supra, that instruction, as 
applied to the original thief, makes no sense when the statute is read as a whole. That 
confusion is particularly evident in this case, since the jury was instructed on the whole 
list of ways theft might be committed under this particular section, not just by disposing 
of stolen property. (R., p.156.) Thus, the district court's departure from the pattern 
instruction failed to offer more clarity on the legal principle involved, and, as such, was 
erroneous. Compare Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 275; Merwin, 131 Idaho at 647. 
Therefore, the pattern instruction is correct under the plain language of I.C. § 18-
2403(4). 
8. If The Plain Language Is Ambiguous, The Rule Of Lenity Applies Because The 
Ambiguity Is In An Element Of The Charged Offense 
The State's argument that the district court properly departed from the pattern 
instruction in an attempt to clarify what the statute actually means - appears to be an 
assertion that the statutory language is ambiguous (i.e., the actual meaning of the 
statute is not clear from its plain language and so it was proper for the district court to 
try and distill what the language actually means). (Resp. Br., pp.7-8.) If this Court 
determines the language of I.C. § 18-2403(4) is indeed ambiguous, it would usually 
strive to give effect to the legislative intent behind the statute. See, e.g., State v. Doe, 
district court erred in r. However, "where the ambiguity exists as to the elements of or 




ambiguity as to the elements of the offense. 
to is us 
is an 
C Proper Application Of The Canons Of Statutory Construction To The Potentially-
Ambiguous Statute Reveals The Pattern Instruction's "By Another" Provision 
Gives Effect To The Legislative Intent 
If the statute is ambiguous and the rule of lenity does not apply, proper analysis 
of the legislative intent of the statute reveals the State's proposed interpretation to be 
erroneous. First, the State's reading of the statute fails to account for the canon of 
statutory construction of noscitur a scoiis ("[a] word is known by the company it keeps"). 
Schulz, 151 Idaho at 867 (internal quotation omitted). Idaho Code 18-2403(4) has a list 
of acts it seeks to prohibit. When a statute contains such a list, noscitur a scoiis 
instructs that the legislative intent is evident from the common denominator between the 
listed factors. See Schulz, 151 Idaho at 867 (explaining that all the items in a list 
defining the term "cohabiting" in LC.§ 18-918(1)(a) "denote a martial relationship" and 
thus, the statutory language revealed the legislative intent for that statute to only apply 
in situations where there was such a relationship between the parties) 
Applying noscitur a scoiis to the list in I.C. § 18-2403(4), three of the listed 
actions - receiving, obtaining control over, and possessing - cannot reasonably be read 
to apply to the original thief. See, e.g., Milanovich, 365 U.S. at 553-54. That means the 
lowest common denominator between all the listed actions is that they are committed by 
a person other than the original thief. As such, noscitur a scoiis reveals the legislative 
8 
Legislature's 
to make a 
the "by another" 
" Id. , the 
statute; it was 
accurate. 
the "by another" 
State's reading 
as 
9 (emphasis from 
interpretation of the statute correctly 
State's reading, one alternative 
still 
2001, ch 112, § 1. bill 
in the 
of IC § 1 
legislative 
the property 
was not changing 
it more concise 
legislative 
language in 
, as identifying 
was stolen" 
that M Weeks' 
behind it In the 
stolen by another. 
second alternative is similarly inapplicable to original thief because there is no 
reasonable way to give effect to 
reasonably induce him to believe the 
by the very act of taking 
was, in fact, stolen. Thus, even giving 
9 
language - "under circumstance as would 
was stolen" - vis-a-vis the original thief, 
the original thief will the property 
the State's distinction, the only way to 
in is 
remove 
"by another" language as "superfluous" did not change the intent behind that 
statute. Thus, the State's argument actually reinforces Mr. Weeks' interpretation of the 
statute if it is ambiguous. 
To try and justify its argument to the contrary, the State contends that some other 
states have read their disposal statutes to be applicable to the original thief. (Resp. 
Br., p.9.) However, as the United States Supreme Court noted while examining the 
legislative history of a similar statute, these sort of code sections are. 
not designed to increase the punishment for him who robs a bank but only 
to provide punishment for those who receive the loot from the robber. We 
find no purpose of Congress to pyramid penalties for the lesser offenses 
following the robbery. It may be true that in logic those who divide up the 
loot following a robbery receive [from] robbers and thus multiply the 
offense. But in view of the legislative h[i]story of [the statutory provision] 
we think Congress was trying to reach a new level of wrongdoers, not to 
multiply the offense of the bank robbers themselves. 
Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 454 (1959); cf United States v. Gaddis, 424 
U.S. 544, 550 n.15 (1976) (reaffirming Heflin in this regard). The Third Circuit explained 
that this holding, along with the holding in Milanovich, was based on constitutional 
double jeopardy considerations: "the underlying premise of the prohibition is 
penological preventing pyramiding of punishment not a philosophical dissection of the 
criminal activity itself." United States v. Trzcinski, 553 F.2d 851, 854 (3rd Cir. 1976). 
Thus, the State in this case is merely trying to validate a scheme whereby 
charges and punishments may be unconstitutionally pyramided against the original thief 
by engaging in the improper philosophical dissection of the criminal act itself. "Where 
10 
constructions of a statute are possible, one resulting in the statute being 
... so as 
second rendering 
conflict with 




110 Idaho 691, 698 (1986). Therefore, regardless of whether other jurisdictions allow 
such unconstitutional prosecutions, this Court should not read Idaho's statute to 
authorize such unconstitutional practices, particularly when this provision can be read 
and enforced in a constitutional manner. 
Furthermore, far more jurisdictions have rejected the sort of argument the 
State presents here. Compare, e.g., State v. Anderson, 575 S.E.2d 371, 764-65 
(W. Va. 2002) (rejecting a similar argument by the State based on the plain language of 
its statute, which includes specific "by another" language, expressly distinguishing two 
of the cases upon which the State relies in this case). The Supreme Court of Guam 
effectively summarized the majority rule: 
Several states follow the same logic [of Heflin] in interpreting their 
respective theft statutes, finding that in enacting a receiving statute, the 
legislature: "[l]ntended to reach a distinct group of wrongdoers. The class 
includes those persons who receive, retain, or dispose of property 
received from another person with the knowledge or reasonable belief that 
the property has been stolen. The legislative intent was not to expand the 
offense of theft, but to create a separate crime." 
People v. Pa!isoc, 2002 Guam 9, 10 (Guam 2002) (quoting People v. Jackson, 627 P.2d 
741 (Colo. 1981), en bane); see a/so Pierce v. State, 627 P.2d 211, 219 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 1981); People v. Jaramillo, 548 P.2d 706, 709 (Cal. 1976), en bane; People v. 
Smith, 938 P.2d 111, 116 (Colo. 1997) en bane ("[T]he General Assembly intended to 
reach a distinct group of wrongdoers who receive, retain, or dispose of property 
received from another person .... "); Thomas v. State, 413 S.E.2d 196, 197 (Ga. 1992); 
11 
Commonwealth v. Dellamano, 469 N 1254, 1255 (Mass. 1984); State v. 
1 (Mo. 1983), en reason 
is , IS 
already covered under the larceny statutes and it would be duplicative to again cover 
the act with the receiving stolen goods statute."), abrogated on other grounds. 
In fact, the Fourth Circuit has expressly applied that rule to a scenario dealing 
with disposal of the stolen property: 
While Proffitt was indicted and found guilty of bartering and disposing of 
the proceeds of the robbery, not for possessing the proceeds, 
we conclude that Heflin is nevertheless applicable .... We are of the 
opinion that Heflin should be construed so that when one is convicted for 
robbery ... and also for bartering [and disposing] ... , both convictions 
may not be sustained. 
Proffitt v. United States, 549 F.2d 910, 911-12 (4th Cir. 1976). 
The majority rule is based on the understanding that "asportation" of the property 
is part of the original thief's criminal act. See, e.g., 3 Wharton's Criminal Law § 447 
(15th ed.); compare State v. Gums, 126 Idaho 930, 932-33 (Ct. App. 1995) (noting that 
actual asportation (physical movement) of the property is no longer an element of theft, 
but that transfer in possession with the intent to permanently deprive is sufficient to 
meet that concept). Thus, whatever the original thief does with the property upon taking 
it (i.e., possess it, withhold it, or dispose of it) his actions are all part of his transferring 
possession of the property with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the 
property. 3 Wharton's Criminal Law § 447 (15th ed.) (identifying twenty jurisdictions 
which adhere to this rule). Therefore, attempts to obtain multiple convictions by 
philosophically dissecting the different aspects of that transferring possession from the 
owner (i.e., breaking apart the possessing from the withholding from the disposing of 
12 
are improper. See id. This is consistent with Idaho's theft statute, as it 
as ing the property in a manner or 
as it unlikely that an owner will recover such 
property." I.C. § 18-2402(3) Thus, disposing of the property is part of the original 
thief's act of theft, not a separate crime, and the State's reliance on the apparent 
minority rule from other states to the contrary is not persuasive. 
In fact, one of the cases upon which the State relies was not evaluating 
a substantially similar statute. (Resp. Br., p.9 (citing State v. Michie/Ii, 937 P.2d 587, 
590-91 (Wa. 1997), en bane).) In Michie/Ii, the Washington Supreme Court reviewed a 
statute addressing "Trafficking in stolen property in the first degree," which applies to "a 
person who knowingly initiates, [etc.] the theft of property for sale to others, or who 
knowingly traffics in stolen property." RCW 9A.82 050(1) Unlike I.C § 18-2403(4), the 
Washington statute, by its plain language, is designed to apply to the original thief who 
steals for the express purpose to sell the property to another, as well as to any other 
person who sells that property with actual knowledge that the property was stolen. 
RCW 9A.82.050(1 ). By contrast, Idaho's statute has no such express provision to apply 
the statute to the original thief if he acts with a particularized intent, and it is not limited 
to only those who have actual knowledge that the property was stolen. See I.C § 18-
2403(4). Since the Washington Supreme Court was not evaluating a substantially 
similar statute, its rationales are uninformative as to how Idaho's statute should be 
understood. Therefore, the State's reliance on Michie/Ii is wholly misplaced. 
At any rate, it is up to Idaho's courts to determine the scope of Idaho's statutes 
based on the language used by Idaho's legislature. See State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 
13 
1, (2007). As discussed supra, Idaho's statute is written such that it is n 
is a 
in 
language of Idaho's statute, application of the rule of lenity, or an examination of 
legislative intent, the State's contention that the district court properly refused to instruct 
the jury on the "by another" element is not meritorious. That element was properly kept 
in the pattern instruction by the Idaho Supreme Court to maintain the clarity of the 
instruction, since that statute is not directed at the original thief. Thus, Mr. Weeks, as 
the original thief, could not be guilty of the underlying theft as a matter of law, and so, he 
cannot be guilty of the burglary allegedly based on that underlying impossible theft. 
Compare State v. Culbreth, 146 Idaho 322, 326-27 (Ct. App. 2008). As such, this Court 
should vacate Mr. Weeks' conviction because the jury was not properly instructed, and 
so, convicted Mr. Weeks' of a legally impossible crime. 
11. 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Weeks' Motion To Dismiss The Information 
A. The Issue, That The Charging Document Failed To Set Forth Facts Establishing 
The Crime Of Burglary, Was Preserved Below 
The State's first response to Mr. Weeks' challenge to the order denying his 
motion to dismiss the information under the burglary statute is an attempt to 
procedurally default his claim. (See Resp. Br., pp.11-12.) It believes that Mr. Weeks' 
challenge to the charging document below - that it should be dismissed "by and for the 
reason that the state failed to educe [sic] sufficient evidence at the Preliminary Hearing 
to establish probable cause that the offense was committed" (R., p.43) - somehow fails 
14 
to argument on appeal, wh is that the district court in denying that 
State failed evidence to show probable cause that 
in committed a The State is several 
reasons. 
First, Mr. Weeks' challenge in the district court was a renewal of the challenge he 
made to the magistrate during the preliminary hearing. (See R., p.43.) At the 
preliminary hearing, trial counsel specifically argued there was not evidence 
establishing probable cause because, inter alia, "burglary is really uh, a concern with a 
space. The space could be the privacy of a home, office building, office, closed vehicle, 
et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. And the felony, the entry with the intent to commit the 
felony is centered on that space." (Tr., Vol.1, p.14, Ls.1 ) In rejecting that argument, 
the magistrate indicated Mr. Weeks could renew that argument in the district court. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.23, Ls.6-8.) Mr. Weeks did that, raising the same challenge in his motion 
dismiss in the district court; he argued the State failed to present evidence 
establishing probable cause that Mr. Weeks had committed the charged offense. 
(R., p.43.) In support of that motion, he explained "[aJ transcript of the Preliminary 
Hearing has been ordered but not yet prepared" (R., p.43.) The district court implicitly 
took judicial notice of that transcript once it was prepared, as it quoted extensively from 
that transcript in its order on the motion to dismiss. (See. e.g., R., pp.76-77.) As such, 
Mr. Weeks' specific argument about the burglary statute's focus on the space entered 
was actually argued by trial counsel below at each level of the proceedings, and so, it is 
properly argued at this level as well. 
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Second, even if trial counsel did not preserve that precise argument to the district 
court's ruling on the preserved it for appeal. Specifically, that 
is challenge to the decision to deny the motion 
dismiss the charge based on its conclusion that the State had presented sufficient 
evidence that Mr. Weeks burglarized the pawn shop. (See R., p.79.) When the district 
court considers and rules on an issue, that decision may be properly challenged for the 
first time on appeal. State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553 (1998). Mr. Weeks has done 
that here, challenging the district court's decision that there was sufficient evidence to 
establish probable cause that he committed the alleged burglary and offered a detailed 
explanation of exactly why the district court's decision in that regard was erroneous 
(namely, that under a proper understanding of the burglary statute, there was 
insufficient evidence to show probable cause that Mr. Weeks had burglarized the pawn 
shop). 
Third, the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that there is a distinction 
between "new arguments" and "new issues" in this context: "While Brandt has made a 
very interesting argument on this issue, ... he has not demonstrated that this is a new 
issue, as opposed to a novel argument concerning an issue previously raised and 
decided on appeal. Seemingly, he presents a new theory which he wants applied to an 
old issue." Brandt v. State, 118 Idaho 350, 352 (1990) (emphasis from original). 
Additionally, "Brandt has also failed to offer any reason for his failure to make this 
argument during the direct appeal." Id. (emphasis added). As such, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the district court's decision dismissing that new argument because while "very 
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Those arguments, which explain how d court erred in regard the preserved 
issue, are so related that overarching issue that they should be settled in the direct 
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Therefore, those arguments are before this Court 118 
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Id 
refuse to address Mr. Weeks' arguments on appeal based on the 
not preserved for appeal is meritless and should be rejected 
that they we re 
8. Mr. Weeks Did Not "Enter" The Pawn Shop As Contemplated By The Burglary 
Statute. And So, Did Not Burglarize The Pawn Shop 
1. The State's Understanding Of The Term "Enter" Is Based On An Exercise 
Of Statutory Construction. Thereby Revealing The Term To Be 
Ambiguous 
On the merits of the claim that Mr. Weeks did not ''enter" the pawn shop as 
contemplated by the burglary statute, the State asserts the burglary statute's language 
is clear from its face, and so, argues the statute simply requires entry into the identified 
space with the requisite intent (Resp. Br., pp.13-14.) The State's argument is 
erroneous because, to reach that conclusion that the term "enter" includes all entries -
the State necessarily relies on the negative implication that the property-owner's 
invitation for people to enter the property is immaterial to the concept of "entry." (See, 
e.g., Resp. Br., p.17 (arguing the lawfulness of the entry is irrelevant).) As such, the 
State's conclusion is reached through an examination of statutory construction, namely, 
an exploration of what the term "enter" includes or does not include within its scope. 
See State v. Bull, 47 Idaho 336, 276 528, 529-30 (1929) (reaching the same 
conclusion as the State based on that same negative implication); compare 
People v. Gauze, 542 P.2d 1365, 1367 (1975), en bane (evaluating the burglary statute 
which Idaho adopted wholesale, and explaining that the interpretation of that statute 
18 
of 
the Bull Court relied 1 was based on an analysis of statutory construction).2 
IS 
is not Stonebrook 
of plain 
v. Chase 
Finance, LLC, 152 Idaho 927, 931 (2012) (reiterating that engaging in statutory 
construction is only appropriate when the plain language is ambiguous). 
Furthermore, even if the State's reading of the statute is reasonable, it does not 
address the fact that Mr. Weeks' reading of the statute is also reasonable. (See App. 
Br., pp.14-20; see generally Resp. Br.) This is important, since the existence of more 
than one reasonable interpretation of the statutory language renders the statute 
ambiguous. Verska, 151 Idaho at 893. Thus, when properly understood, the language 
of the burglary statute is ambiguous. 
2. Since The Plain Language Is Ambiguous. The Rule Of Lenity Applies 
Because That Ambiguity Relates To An Element Of The Charged Offense 
The State does not address Mr. Weeks' assertion that, since the ambiguity goes 
to the elements of the offense, this Court should apply the rule of lenity. (App. 
Br., pp.20-21; see generally Resp. Br.) Since "the ambiguity exists as to the elements 
of or potential sanctions for a crime, this Court [should] strictly construe the statute in 
1 The Bull Court relied on People v. Barry, 29 P. 1026 (Cal. 1892). Bull, 276 P. at 529; 
see Gauze, 542 P.2d at 1367 (explaining that Barry's conclusion was the product of an 
exercise of statutory construction). 
2 It is this more complete understanding of the burglary statute and the previous 
decisions on this point which shows that Buffs interpretation of the burglary statute is 
manifestly wrong and unjust. (See also Section 11(8)(2), infra (discussing the problems 
in such an interpretation); App. Br., pp.20-28 (same).) Therefore, contrary to the State's 
assertion (Resp. Br., p.16 n.4), this Court should overrule or abrogate Bull in giving 
proper effect to the legislative intent behind the ambiguous language in the burglary 
statute. 
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defendant 140 at that this Court should 
and so, the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the resulting 
burglary charge. 
3. The Legislative Intent Behind The Ambiguous Language In The Burglary 
Statute Is To Prevent Unlawful Entries Into A Particular Space So As To 
Protect The Possessory Interest The Owner Has In That Space 
Even if this Court does not apply the rule of lenity to the entry element of the 
burglary statute, the State's cursory argument as to the interpretation of this ambiguous 
statute - that this statute should be read to apply to all entries, regardless of lawfulness 
(Resp. Br., p.17) - is unavailing. The State argues: that the Legislature amended the 
burglary statute away from its common law roots, which it is free to do since the United 
States Supreme Court has not articulated a national definition for burglary. (Resp. 
Br., pp.14-17.) While both assertions are factually accurate, neither actually speaks to 
the Idaho Legislature's intent for Idaho's burglary statute as it has been amended, and 
so, neither point is truly relevant to the discussion at hand. 
In regard to the Legislature's decisions to amend away certain. but not all, of the 
common-law elements of burglary, the State does not address Mr. Weeks' argument 
regarding the Legislature's intent behind those various amendments. ( See App. 
Br., pp.20-28; see generally Resp. Br., pp.14-16.) That is important, since the whole 
point of examining statutory construction for an ambiguous statute is to understand and 
give effect to the legislative intent behind the statute. See, e.g., Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho at 
475. As discussed in depth in the Appellant's Brief, the legislative intent behind those 
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- the removal of overly-limiting common-law elements was 
core concern the 
possessory in space entered. 
, pp.20-28.) Therefore, the legislative intent, as actually evidenced by the 
subsequent amendments, continues to be for the burglary statute to apply only when 
the entry violates the owner's possessory interest in the space entered. Otherwise, the 
statute would not be seeking to prevent any sort of independently-harmful act. 
Compare, e.g., Gauze, 452 P.2d at 1368 (reaching this same conclusion); State v. 
Baca, 331 P.3d 971, 974 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014) (same); State v. Boone, 256 S.E.2d 687 
(N.C. 1979) (same). 
If the statute were read such that it was not seeking to prevent an independently-
harmful act, as the State does, burglary would mutate into an enhancement for the 
underlying alleged crime rather than existing as the separate crime it is supposed to be. 
e.g., State v. McCormick, 100 Idaho 111, 114-15 (1979). Thus, the State's 
argument would improperly expand the burglary statute far beyond the scope intended 
by the Legislature, and thereby, "render the statute so broad as to make it virtually 
meaningless." Boone, 256 S.E.2d at 687 (rejecting a similar argument in regard to a 
similar statute). Thus, this Court should reject the State's reading of the statute, as it 
does not give effect to the legislative intent for this statute. 
The State's second point is similarly meritless. Its contention - that Idaho is free 
to define burglary in its own way because the United States Supreme Court has not set 
a national definition of burglary - completely misunderstands the point for which 
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), and Descamps v. United States, 133 S. 
21 
13), were cited in Mr. Weeks' initial brief. App. Br., pp.17-19.) did 
seems 
as or some of rglary. 
Resp. Br., pp.16-17.) In fact, he acknowledged they do no such thing. (App. Br., p.18.) 
Rather, Mr. Weeks discussed those cases because they recognize the fundamental 
point he is arguing: the legislative intent behind this sort of burglary statute is to prevent 
the unlawful invasion of the possessory interest the owner has in the space entered. 
(App. Br., p.18.) Simply put, they show his reading of Idaho's statute is a reasoanble 
one. 
Regardless, the question when analyzing an ambiguous statute is which of the 
reasonble interpretations gives effect to the legislative intent. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho at 
475. Based only on its assertion that Idaho has exercised its ability to define burglary 
as something other than its common law ancestor, the State concludes: "the legislature 
did not intend the burgarly statute to apply only to those who commit an unlawful entry 
into a building or structure, or who otherwise intrudes upon the propriety or privacy 
interest fo the owner or occupier of a building or vehicle" (Resp. Br., p.17.) Apart from 
the fact that an actual analysis of the legislative intent reveals that claim to be erronous 
(see App. Br., pp.20-28), that conclusion is contrary to Idaho precedent. 
Idaho's courts have repeatedly recognized a component of lawfulness in the 
"entries" addressed under the burglary statute, describing them as "unlawful entries."3 
See, e.g., See, e.g., State v. Haggard, 89 Idaho 217, 230 (1965) ("Idaho Code § 18-
3 The fact that there is a concept of lawfulness associated with the idea of "entry" under 
the burglary statute further reveals that there are two reasonable interpretations of that 
term, making the statute ambiguous. 
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1 the crime of burglary. this is committed upon the 
the or ") (emphasis 
V. 1 Idaho 1 1 1 a case 
involving several charges of burglary and grand theft as beginning when "a Boise 
resident observed three individuals . appearing to unlawfully enter a neighbor's 
house.") (emphasis added); State v. Cirelli, 115 Idaho 732, 733 (Ct App. 1989) ("The 
search revealed numerous items that had been taken in various recent burglaries. 
Some of the stolen property was recognized by the police as items reported missing 
from a storage unit which had been unlawfully entered sometime during the week prior 
to the search.") (emphasis added); State v. Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct App. 
1985) ("[The defendant) was convicted of burglary in the second degree, petit theft and 
forgery. These charges arose from an unlawful entry into a closed motor vehcile [and] 
the stealing of traveler's checks from the vehicle .... ") (empahsis added). 
These decisions reflect the common usage and understanding of the term "enter" 
in the burglary context: it includes a concept of unlawfulness This further reveals the 
legislative intent for that statute to apply to unlawful entries, meaning those which 
intrude upon the possessory interest of the owner of the space entered. See, e.g., 
Nagel v. Hammond, 90 Idaho 96, 100 (1965) ("Words that are in common use among 
the people should be given the same meaning in a statute as they have among the 
great mass of people who are expected to read, obey, and uphold them."). Because 
Mr. Weeks did not intrude upon the possessory interest of the pawn store owner by 
entering the pawn shop to do precisely what the pawn store owner invited him inside to 
do - pawn property - Mr. Weeks did not burgle the pawn shop per the statute. As such, 
23 
preliminary hearing probable cause 
I I I. 
There Was Insufficient Evidence To Convict Mr. Weeks Of Burglarizing The Pawn ShoQ 
The State's responses concerning the sufficiency of the evidence are not 
remarkable. The arguments on this issue mirror those discussed in Section 11, supra, in 
that the State failed to present evidence at trial showing Mr. Weeks burglarized the 
pawn shop for the same reasons it failed to present such evidence at the preliminary 
hearing - Mr. Weeks' actions did not constitute burglary as it is defined by the statute. 
Since the State simply cross-applies its arguments from the preliminary hearing issue, 
no further reply is necessary on this point Accordingly, Mr. Weeks simply refers the 
Court back to Section 11, supra, and to pages 28-29 of his Appellant's Brief. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Weeks respectfully requests this Court vacate the verdict and judgment 
of conviction remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 4th day of December, 2015. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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